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Anticipation of guilt for everyday 
moral transgressions: The role of 
the anterior insula and the influence 
of interpersonal psychopathic traits
Ana Seara-Cardoso1,2, Catherine L. Sebastian3, Eamon McCrory1, Lucy Foulkes1,4, 
Marine Buon1,5, Jonathan P. Roiser4,* & Essi Viding1,4,*
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised by atypical moral behaviour likely rooted in atypical 
affective/motivational processing, as opposed to an inability to judge the wrongness of an action. 
Guilt is a moral emotion believed to play a crucial role in adherence to moral and social norms, but the 
mechanisms by which guilt (or lack thereof) may influence behaviour in individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits are unclear. We measured neural responses during the anticipation of guilt about 
committing potential everyday moral transgressions, and tested the extent to which these varied with 
psychopathic traits. We found a significant interaction between the degree to which anticipated guilt 
was modulated in the anterior insula and interpersonal psychopathic traits: anterior insula modulation 
of anticipated guilt was weaker in individuals with higher levels of these traits. Data from a second 
sample confirmed that this pattern of findings was specific to the modulation of anticipated guilt and 
not related to the perceived wrongness of the transgression. These results suggest a central role for the 
anterior insula in coding the anticipation of guilt regarding potential moral transgressions and advance 
our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms that may underlie propensity to antisocial 
behaviour.
In the past decade there has been increasing interest in the neurocognitive processes that underlie moral cogni-
tion1. However, we still do not fully understand how these processes may contribute to both atypical and typical 
morality. Why, for example, do some of individuals routinely engage in irresponsible and immoral behaviour? 
And, more importantly, why do these individuals engage in this kind of behaviour in spite of apparently being 
capable of appropriate moral reasoning?
Individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits, which include blunted affect and a lack of empathy and guilt, 
have an increased risk of engaging in irresponsible and antisocial behaviours2. Yet, they do not appear to differ from 
individuals with low levels of these traits in relation to their moral judgment ability, i.e. the ability to judge whether an 
action is immoral or not3–9 (though see refs 10, 11 for exceptions). However, they do report less difficulty in making 
decisions when faced with moral dilemmas6,7,9 and present diminished neural responses in the amygdala and other 
regions typically associated with affective processing when they perform moral judgment tasks4,5,8,12,13. Atypical moral 
behaviour in these individuals seems to stem not from an inability to compute moral judgments, but rather from a 
disruption of the affective and motivational components of moral processing that may be important for adjusting one’s 
behaviour so as not to harm others3,14,15. In other words, individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits seem to know 
what is wrong, but do not feel it to be wrong; and therefore fail to inhibit actions that may harm others.
Previous neuroimaging studies on moral processing in psychopathy have relied on paradigms that involved 
judging actions from a third person perspective5,13 and judging highly hypothetical and often extreme moral 
dilemmas (e.g. killing one person to save the lives of many)4,8. It is still unclear whether individual differences in 
psychopathic traits are associated with atypical neural processing of first-person scenarios for more normative 
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moral transgressions that could happen in everyday life, and whether atypical neural processing relates to 
emotional and motivational aspects of everyday moral behaviour. Recent work indicates that the adherence to 
moral and social norms largely depends on emotional processes, rather than on the ability to make moral judge-
ments16,17. Guilt proneness (the predisposition to experience negative feelings about personal wrongdoings), in 
particular, has been found to consistently predict appropriate moral behaviour18 and to be negatively associated 
with levels of psychopathic traits6,19. Guilt can provide immediate and salient feedback on either executed or 
imagined behaviour16 and the anticipation of feelings of guilt about committing a transgression can thus work 
as a ‘powerful brake’ that curbs antisocial or immoral behaviour. Investigating the neural correlates involved in 
processing the anticipation of guilt about committing more ordinary everyday moral transgressions may provide 
important cues to the mechanisms that underlie propensity to antisocial behaviour.
To address these questions, we developed a novel fMRI task with guilt-eliciting everyday moral scenarios, and 
set out to test whether variance in psychopathic traits is associated with neural processing of anticipated guilt for 
personal, everyday moral transgressions. Inside the scanner, participants were instructed to imagine themselves 
in each scenario and to rate how guilty they would feel; this allowed us to identify regions that parametrically 
encoded the strength of anticipated feelings of guilt. Subsequently, we conducted a follow-up study where a sec-
ond group of participants performed a variation of the everyday moral scenarios fMRI task in which participants 
were asked to assess the wrongness of the action presented. This was to test whether any pattern of processing 
related to psychopathic traits was linked with the anticipation of feelings of guilt specifically, as opposed to the 
assessment of the ‘wrongness’ of the transgression. As discussed above, although adherence to moral and social 
norms has been hypothesised to depend largely on subjective emotional responses, rather than the ability to tell 
right from wrong16,17,20,21; these two processes have not been explicitly disambiguated in previous neuroimaging 
studies investigating moral processing and psychopathic traits.
We predicted that the processing of everyday personal moral transgressions would elicit responses in brain 
regions that have consistently been associated with moral cognition, including temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG), anterior insula (aINS), amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)1,22–25. 
We further predicted that modulation of trial-by-trial variation in feelings of anticipated guilt (but not wrong-
ness) would be observed in the aINS. The aINS is thought to support interoception of subjective emotional 
states26,27, has been consistently identified in previous work examining the neural correlates of guilt17,28–31 and has 
been shown to vary in activation with the strength of overall emotional appraisals of moral situations24,32, point-
ing to an important role for this region in encoding aversive responses to moral transgressions. Finally, based on 
the hypothesis that atypical moral behaviour observed in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits is 
rooted in motivational/affective impairments, we predicted that responses in regions encoding the anticipation 
of feelings of guilt (but not wrongness) about committing moral transgressions would be negatively associated 
with psychopathic traits.
Results
Task and questionnaire data. Our fMRI task (Fig. 1) comprised scripts of scenarios of potential everyday 
moral transgressions that typically evoke a sense of personal culpability. Scenarios were presented in the second 
person, as if the participant was the agent, and described personal goals achieved by causing harm either to 
another person or to oneself, thus representing a moral transgression or a morally neutral (but similarly unpleas-
ant) situation, respectively. The latter acted as our control condition. Inside the scanner, participants (32 males 
recruited from the community) were instructed to imagine themselves in each scenario and to rate how guilty 
they would feel. After scanning, as a post-task manipulation check to ensure that both types of scenarios elicited 
different levels of guilt but similar levels of negative affect, participants were asked to read the scenarios for a 
second time and to rate how upset they would feel in each situation. As expected, ‘guilt’ ratings were significantly 
higher in scenarios depicting moral transgressions (harm-to-other scenarios) compared with control scenarios 
(harm-to-self scenarios) (t(27) = 8.96; p < 0.001; ‘harm-to-other’: M = 5.50, SD = 0.62; ‘harm-to-self ’: M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.03). By contrast, both types of scenarios elicited similar levels of negative affect: ‘upset’ ratings were com-
parable between the conditions (t(27) = − 0.02; p = 0.99; ‘harm-to-other’: M = 4.76, SD = 0.93; ‘harm-to-self ’: 
M = 4.75, SD = 0.97).
Psychopathic traits were assessed using the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short-Form (SRP33), a well val-
idated measure comprising affective (e.g. callousness), interpersonal (e.g. deceitfulness), lifestyle (e.g. impul-
siveness) and antisocial behaviour facets of psychopathy. Interpersonal and lifestyle psychopathic traits were 
significantly negatively associated with ratings of anticipated guilt in moral transgressions scenarios (interper-
sonal: r = − 0.53, p < 0.01; lifestyle: r = − 0.43, p = 0.02; respectively; Table S1). There were no significant associa-
tions between psychopathic traits and ratings of guilt in control scenarios, nor with ratings of upset in either type 
of scenarios (Table S1).
Neural processing of anticipated guilt for everyday moral transgressions. First, to allow compar-
ison with previous literature on the neural basis of moral cognition, we inspected brain regions that responded 
differentially to scenarios depicting moral transgressions (‘harm-to-other’) compared to control (‘harm-to-self ’) 
scenarios (“main effect” model; see ‘Experimental Procedures’ and ‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for 
full details, including statistical thresholds and region-of-interest (ROI) definition). Significant responses were 
observed in a network of brain regions that has consistently been associated with moral cognition1: aINS, SMG, 
vmPFC (all p < 0.05, whole-brain corrected (WBC)), and amygdala (p < 0.05, small-volume corrected (SVC)) 
(Table 1 and Fig. 2).
Critically, we inspected whether there were specific brain regions that parametrically encoded the strength 
of anticipated feelings of guilt about committing moral transgressions (“parametric modulation” model; see 
‘Experimental Procedures’ and ‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for full details, including statistical 
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thresholds and region-of-interest (ROI) definition). We identified a positive parametric modulation of feelings 
of guilt elicited by moral transgressions in aINS at an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001 (i.e. ratings of feelings 
of guilt correlated positively with BOLD response in this region on a trial-by-trial basis), although this did not 
survive correction for multiple comparisons ([x, y, z: − 30 29 16], Z = 3.85, k = 4, p = 0.13, SVC).
Associations between neural processing of anticipated guilt for everyday moral transgressions 
and psychopathic traits. We then examined whether variability in processing of anticipated guilt for every-
day moral scenarios was associated with psychopathic traits by adding each facet of psychopathy separately as a 
regressor of interest in the parametric modulation model. We identified negative associations between the mod-
ulation of anticipated feelings of guilt and interpersonal psychopathic traits in the aINS, bilaterally (right: [x, y, 
z: 48 − 1 − 5], k = 11, Z = 3.84, p = 0.03, SVC; left: [x, y, z: − 36 8 7]; k = 9, Z = 3.69, p = 0.04, SVC). To further 
understand the nature of these interactions, we extracted the parameter estimates (betas) from these clusters’ 
peaks. Note that these parameter estimates correspond to the regression slope linking the trial-by-trial BOLD 
response in aINS with the trial-by-trial variation in guilt ratings for each specific participant. For illustrative 
purposes only (Fig. 3), we divided participants into tertiles of low, medium and high psychopathic interpersonal 
traits, computed the average parameter estimate (i.e. the average regression slope) for each tertile group, and 
used these average parameter estimates to plot the increasing BOLD response in aINS along the guilt rating scale. 
Participants with lower levels of psychopathic interpersonal traits had steeper regression slopes; with relatively flat 
slopes for those with high levels of psychopathic interpersonal traits. That is, anticipated feelings of guilt increased 
linearly with BOLD response in aINS for those with low and medium levels of psychopathic interpersonal traits, 
but not for those with high levels of these traits.
For completeness, we examined whether variability in brain response evoked by guilt-eliciting moral trans-
gression (vs. control) scenarios was associated with psychopathic traits (main effect model). Adding each facet of 
psychopathy separately as a regressor of interest in the main effect model identified positive associations between 
neural response and antisocial behaviour traits in the vmPFC ([x, y, z: − 6 53 − 11], k = 43; Z =  3.64, p = 0.05, 
SVC) and amygdala ([x, y, z: − 21 − 4 − 14], k = 5, Z = 3.45, p = 0.02, SVC).
Study 2: Dissociating neural processing of anticipated guilt from wrongness judgments evoked 
by moral transgressions. To confirm that this pattern of findings was specific to the modulation of antici-
pated guilt and not related to the perceived wrongness of the transgression, we conducted a follow-up study where 
we scanned a second group of 32 participants while performing a variation of the everyday moral scenarios fMRI 
task. In this task variation, participants judged the wrongness of the transgressions instead of rating anticipated 
guilt. All stimuli and task parameters were unchanged. This second group did not differ from the initial group in 
Figure 1. Everyday moral transgressions task. (A) Task timeline for two non-consecutive trials. Participants 
were presented with each scenario over three screens, representing each phase of the trial: 1) Presentation of 
the personal goal (‘Setup’; 4 s); 2) Presentation of the ending, i.e. harm-to-other or harm-to-self (‘Outcome’; 
6 s); 3) Rating of guilt (in the Guilt task) or wrongness (in the Moral Judgment task) on a sliding scale (‘Rating’, 
0–4 s); (B) Manipulation check. Ratings of ‘Guilt’ and ‘Upset’ (Guilt task) and ‘Wrongness’ (Moral Judgment 
task) on harm-to-other and harm-to-self trials. These scenarios elicited similar levels of negative emotional 
state (t(27) = − 0.02; p = 0.99), but differed in terms of levels of guilt (t(27) = 8.96; p < 0.001). Moral judgments (i.e. 
wrongness judgments) ratings were significantly higher in harm-to-other scenarios compared with harm-to-self 
(t(28) = 24.29; p < 0.001). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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terms of means or variances in any psychopathic personality facet or total score. They did differ in age (t = 2.62, 
p = 0.01) and therefore age was added as a covariate in all comparison analyses (see ‘Experimental Procedures’ 
and ‘Table S2’ for full details).
Task and questionnaire data. Judgments of wrongness were significantly higher in moral transgression 
(harm-to-other) than in control (harm-to-self) scenarios (t(28)  =  24.29; p < 0.001). There were no significant 
associations between moral judgments in either type of scenarios and psychopathic traits (Table S1).
Neural processing of moral judgments about committing moral transgressions. As before, to allow comparison 
with previous literature on the neural basis of moral cognition and with our previous results, we inspected brain 
regions that responded differentially to scenarios depicting moral transgressions compared to control scenar-
ios (“main effect” model; see ‘Experimental Procedures’ and ‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for full 
details, including statistical thresholds and region-of-interest (ROI) definition). Analysis of the main effect model 
of this version of the task implicated a comparable set of regions as reported for the guilt task (clusters in vmPFC, 
SMG and aINS all p < 0.05, WBC; Table 1, Fig. 2; amygdala p < 0.05, SVC; Table 1). Conjunction analysis of the 
main-effects of the two tasks confirmed that the same set of regions was recruited during both tasks (Table 1; 
Fig. 2). The main effects did not differ significantly between the two tasks.
Analysis of the parametric modulation model (here incorporating wrongness judgments) revealed positive 
modulations in TPJ and SMG at an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001 (i.e. wrongness ratings correlated posi-
tively with response in these regions), but these did not survive corrections for multiple comparisons (TPJ: [x, y, 
z: − 60 − 49 22], Z = 3.12, k = 1, p = 0.23, SVC; SMG: [x, y, z: − 51 − 25 22], Z = 3.43, k = 3, p = 0.10, SVC; [x, y, 
z: − 57 − 49 25], Z = 3.16, k = 2, p = 0.20, SVC). Such modulation was not evident in other regions, even at a more 
liberal uncorrected threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected). Conjunction analyses of the parametric modulators of 
Region L/R x y Z Z k PFWE
Guilt task
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex L − 9 53 10 5.59 1288 < 0.01
Supramarginal gyrus R 54 − 31 22 5.09 168 < 0.01
Insula R 39 5 1 4.89 337 < 0.01
Postcentral gyrus L − 54 − 19 19 4.49 190 < 0.01
Cerebellum R 12 − 64 − 11 4.39 268 < 0.01
Putamen L − 27 − 7 10 4.23 84 0.02
 Ext. to insula L − 36 2 16 4.01
Posterior middle temporal gyrus R 45 − 67 10 4.01 100 0.01
Middle frontal gyrus L − 27 44 28 3.86 94 0.01
Parahippocampal gyrus L − 30 − 13 − 20 3.84 83 0.02
Amygdalaa R 30 − 7 − 17 4.23 9 < 0.01
Amygdalaa L − 24 − 7 − 17 3.52 15 0.02
Moral judgment task
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex L − 9 56 7 5.98 1855 < 0.01
Supramarginal gyrus R 57 − 16 28 5.15 114 < 0.01
Cerebellum R 21 − 49 − 26 4.83 89 0.01
Insula R 36 5 7 4.47 475 < 0.01
Insula L − 45 2 4 4.42 481 < 0.01
Amygdalaa R 24 2 − 14 4.09 38 < 0.01
Amygdalaa L − 15 − 1 − 17 3.36 2 0.03
Amygdalaa L − 27 − 4 − 14 3.28 4 0.03
Guilt AND Moral Judgment tasks
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex L − 9 56 7 6.06 1066 < 0.01
Insula R 39 5 4 4.65 146 < 0.01
Supramarginal gyrus R 57 − 16 28 5.15 114 < 0.01
Cerebellum R 21 − 49 − 26 4.83 89 0.01
Insula R 36 5 7 4.47 475 < 0.01
Insula L − 45 2 4 4.42 481 < 0.01
Amygdalaa R 30 − 7 − 17 3.97 8 < 0.01
Amygdalaa L − 27 — − 17 3.37 4 0.02
Table 1.  Neural correlates of harm-to-others vs. harm-to-self scenarios. Note: Regions are reported at 
p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-corrected, after an initial threshold of P < 0.001 (uncorrected), k > 10, unless 
otherwise stated. Spatial coordinates (x, y, z) are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. R = Right; L = Left. 
aRegions reported at P < 0.05, small-volume FWE voxel-level corrected within a bilateral anatomical amygdala 
mask, following an initial threshold of P < 0.001 (uncorrected).
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the two tasks (i.e. wrongness judgments and feelings of guilt) yielded no significant results; in other words, in no 
region did the parametric relationships between BOLD responses and feelings of wrongness and guilt overlap. 
There were also no significant differential modulation effects between the two tasks.
Associations between neural processing of moral judgments for everyday moral transgressions and psychopathic 
traits. We found no significant effects of psychopathic traits in the moral judgment parametric modulation 
model, either at whole-brain or in ROIs. Critically, comparing the effects of interpersonal psychopathic traits 
on the two parametric modulation models (i.e., effect of interpersonal psychopathic traits on modulation of 
wrongness judgments compared to effect of interpersonal psychopathic traits on modulation of anticipated guilt) 
revealed a significant interaction in the aINS ([x, y, z: − 36 5 13], k = 23, Z = 4.08, p = 0.05, SVC). The association 
of interpersonal psychopathic traits with the aINS modulation by feelings of guilt was significantly stronger than 
the equivalent association with the modulation by judgments of wrongness. To further understand the nature 
of this difference, we extracted and plotted the average modulation betas from this cluster’s peak, as described 
above. As shown in Fig. 3, the encoding of wrongness in aINS did not differ between groups with different levels 
of interpersonal psychopathic traits. Follow-up t-test analyses of the extracted modulation betas confirmed a 
significant positive parametric modulation effect in aINS of anticipated guilt (t = 2.72; p = 0.01, 1-tailed) but not 
of wrongness judgments (t = 0.35; 0 = 0.36, 1-tailed).
As before, for completeness, we examined whether variability in brain response evoked by judging the wrong-
ness of harm-to-other (vs. harm-to-self) scenarios was associated with psychopathic traits (main effect model). 
No significant associations were found.
Discussion
Processing potential personal everyday moral transgressions elicited responses in a distributed network of brain 
regions, consistent with that reported in previous neuroimaging studies investigating moral processing. These 
included: the SMG, reliably associated with processing self and other-related information; the amygdala and aINS, 
which have been strongly linked with affective processing; and the vmPFC, which has been hypothesised to integrate 
inputs from this distributed network to calculate the overall value of a given action1,22–25. Our conjunction analyses 
revealed that considering transgressions evoked responses in this network, irrespective of whether participants were 
anticipating feelings of guilt or were judging wrongness. Taken together with prior research, our results suggest that 
the same core circuit is engaged during moral processing, irrespective of the familiarity of the moral scenario (every-
day vs. unusual) or of the nature of the processing (guilt antecipation vs. judgments of wrongness).
We also obtained a more fine-grained picture of the precise role that the different components of this circuit 
play in driving atypical moral behaviour, specifically identifying an interaction between the parametric modu-
lation of aINS responses by anticipated feelings of guilt and levels of interpersonal psychopathic traits. The aINS 
parametrically encoded the strength of anticipated guilt, though not for those with higher levels of psychopathic 
Figure 2. Neural correlates of everyday moral transgressions. Main effects (harm-to-other > harm-to-self) of 
the guilt task (A), the moral judgment task (B) and their conjunction (C). Significant activations across both tasks are 
present in the left anterior insula, left amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, right amygdala, right anterior insula 
and right supramarginal gyrus (highlighted, from left to right). Overlays are thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) 
and superimposed on the MNI 152 template brain provided in MRIcroGL40 for illustrative purposes.
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interpersonal traits. It is thought that the aINS has a key role in the interoceptive awareness of subjective feel-
ings26,27. The aINS has been identified in previous imaging studies where participants read guilt- eliciting sen-
tences29 or stories28, recalled past guilt-eliciting situations17 or were given guilt-eliciting feedback30, indicating the 
importance of this region in processing feelings of guilt. Two recent studies have also shown that response in this 
region varies with the strength of the overall emotional appraisal of moral situations24,32. However, the nature of 
the tasks used in these previous studies precluded the inspection of whether the aINS response varied with the 
strength of feelings of guilt. Our results extend these previous findings, suggesting that it may play a critical role 
in signalling the strength of anticipated feelings of guilt about committing moral transgressions. At least in those 
with low-to-medium levels of interpersonal psychopathic traits.
Data from our second experiment confirmed that the negative association between the strength of antic-
ipated guilt encoding in the aINS and individual differences in interpersonal psychopathic traits could not 
be explained by processing associated with wrongness judgments. Our results provide new evidence that 
psychopathic traits moderate the neural processing of guilt, rather than of moral judgments of wrongness, 
in line with the hypothesis that atypical moral behaviour in individuals with high levels of psychopathic 
traits is related to affective and motivational components of moral processing rather than in an inabil-
ity to compute moral judgments3,14,15. Anticipation of guilt may influence behaviour, acting as a ‘‘moral 
brake’’ and decreasing the likelihood of those behaviours that will cause harm to others and guilt in our-
selves. Insensitivity to anticipated guilt may help explain the lack of care for others’ well-being and difficulty 
in adhering to moral rules which are characteristic of individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits, 
despite apparent appropriate moral reasoning.
Figure 3. Modulation of feelings of guilt and wrongness judgments in anterior insula. (A) Cluster in the 
anterior insula where psychopathic interpersonal traits were associated with the modulation of activation by 
feelings of anticipated guilt, but not by wrongness judgments ([x, y, z: − 36 5 13], k = 23, Z = 4.08, p > 0.05, 
SVC). The overlay is thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected). Inset: second level SPM design matrix showing 
the contrast; columns (left to right) represent: 1) parametric modulation of anticipated guilt feelings (from 
Study 1); 2) parametric modulation of wrongness judgments (from Study 2); 3) age; 4) and 5) interpersonal 
psychopathic traits from Studies 1 and 2, respectively. (B) Bars depict the average regression slopes between 
trial-by-trial guilt/moral judgment ratings and BOLD response at the anterior insula peak voxel (from A); error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean. (C) Graphs illustrate the simulation of the modulation of activation 
by anticipated feelings of guilt (left) and judgments of wrongness (right) at the anterior insula for individuals 
with low, medium and high levels of psychopathic traits. For illustrative purposes, modulation betas (i.e. 
regression slopes between BOLD response and ratings) from the anterior insula peak voxel in A were extracted, 
participants were divided into tertiles of low, medium and high psychopathic interpersonal traits, and an 
average modulation beta value was computed for each tertile group and used to estimate the hypothetical BOLD 
response for each point of the rating scale.
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One limitation of our study is that the aINS encoding of the degree of anticipated guilt failed to reach signif-
icance after correction for multiple comparisons. It is possible that our study design was not optimally sensitive 
to detect this effect; a larger set of trials per task condition and a larger number of participants could represent 
improvements in this respect. However, a smaller effect for this relationship overall is perhaps unsurprising given 
that it showed modulation by individual differences in psychopathic traits, which may diluted the main effect. 
Likewise, it is possible that other individual differences effects explain why the encoding of wrongness judgments 
in TPJ/SMG did not survive stringent correction for multiple comparisons. These results show the importance of 
taking individual differences into account and show using individual differences such as psychopathic traits can 
shed light on the functioning of the typical system.
In conclusion, our results extend the understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in moral 
cognition and provide new links between these mechanisms and psychopathic traits. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study suggesting that the aINS plays a role in signalling anticipated feelings of guilt in response to potential 
everyday moral transgressions. We showed that the strength of this signalling varied negatively with individual 
differences in interpersonal psychopathic traits, consistent with the hypothesis that anticipation of guilt is atten-
uated in those with high levels of such traits. Importantly, we showed that this pattern of findings was specific to 
neural responses to anticipated feelings of guilt, and not linked to moral judgments. Our data align with models 
of atypical moral behaviour that propose that individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits may not lack the 
ability to compute moral judgments per se, but instead fail to generate the attendant negative affective states that 
usually inhibit harmful actions towards others, such as anticipated guilt.
Methods
Participants. After completing biographical screening questionnaires, two groups of 32 right-handed male 
participants with no reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders were scanned. Following exclusions 
(see ‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for full details), data from 28 participants in each group were ana-
lysed (mean age: 26.3 (Study1) and 23.0 (Study 2); age range 20–40 (Study 1) and 20–34 (Study 2)). Both studies 
were conducted in full accordance with the guidelines set by UCL Division of Psychology and Language Sciences 
Ethics Committee who provided ethical approval for this study. All participants provided written informed 
consent.
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short-Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus et al. 2015). The SRP-SF is a 
well-validated trait measure of psychopathy designed to measure psychopathic attributes in community samples. 
It is composed of four underlying facets indexing affective (e.g. “I never feel guilty over hurting others”), inter-
personal (e.g. “I have pretended to be someone else in order to get something”), lifestyle (e.g. “I’ve often done 
something dangerous just for the thrill of it”) and antisocial (e.g. “I have broken into a building or vehicle in order 
to steal something or vandalize”) features of the psychopathic personality. The SRP-SF shows a clear latent struc-
ture, good construct validity34 and is strongly correlated with the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised33,35, the standard 
clinical interview measure for psychopathy. Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “Disagree Strongly” 
to 5 “Agree Strongly”). In the present study, SRP-SF scores presented similar distributions to previousy reported 
distributions from larger samples of adults from the general population7,33,36,37 (please refer to ‘Supplementary 
Information’ for further details).
Everyday moral transgressions task. We developed a novel, well-controlled task that presented scripts of 
realistic everyday moral scenarios for participants to read. Twenty-eight scenarios with two different endings were 
initially created for this task. These scenarios comprised descriptions of personal goals, each with two possible 
endings: causing harm to another person, or harm to oneself. These two endings thus represented either a moral 
transgression or a morally neutral (but still unpleasant) situation. The endings of the scenarios were matched in 
terms of: ratings of negative affect; participant perspective and agency; number of characters participating in 
the scenario; order of presentation of relevant information; and word number. Furthermore, all scenarios (both 
those containing harm to other and those containing harm to oneself) clearly indicated the intentionality of the 
protagonist and the consequences of the action. A two-phase pilot study was conducted to select the 15 best sce-
narios for the fMRI task in an independent sample. In the pilot study, 40 participants read the stories and were 
asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist, rate how guilty and upset they would feel, and how morally wrong 
the action in the story was. The scenarios chosen for the present study were those where the two endings were 
closely matched for negative affect (i.e. upset ratings on harm-to-other were not significantly different from upset 
ratings on harm-to-self), but where only the moral transgression ending elicited guilt and was judged as clearly 
morally wrong (i.e. mean ratings of harm-to-other scenarios were above the middle point of the guilt and of the 
wrongness judgment scales).
Prior to scanning, participants were familiarised with the task and instructions using practice stimuli. During 
scanning, participants were presented with 30 trials (15 scenarios with two endings each), and were instructed 
to imagine themselves in each situation and rate how guilty they would feel. Trials comprised three stages: 1) 
presentation of the personal goal (‘setup’; 4 s); 2) presentation of the ending, i.e. harm-to-other or harm-to-self to 
achieve the goal (‘outcome’; 6 s); and 3) rating of subjective guilt on a sliding scale (1 [‘Not at all’] to 7 [‘A lot’] after 
a prompt question ‘How guilty would you feel?’ (Study 1) or ‘How wrong would this be?’ (Study 2). Participants 
made their ratings using a keypad. Two keys moved the cursor (initially positioned in the centre of the scale) to 
the left or right, and a third key registered the answer. After registering their ratings, participants received visual 
confirmation of their answer for 1 s before the next trial started. Participants had a maximum of 4 s to make their 
ratings. If a rating was not made within that time, the trial was considered an error. Fifteen null trials, where 
the sentence ‘This is a small break, please keep still’ appeared on the screen for 10 s, were included. Trials were 
presented in a pseudorandom order to prevent more than two consecutive trials of the same type and more than 
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one consecutive null trial. After scanning, as a manipulation check to ensure that both types of scenarios elicited 
similar levels of negative affect, participants were asked to read the scenarios for a second time and to rate how 
upset they would feel in each situation. To verify the scale integrity of the newly developed task, scale reliability 
analyses were conducted. All Cronbach’s alphas were good (guilt ratings in Study 1 (transgression scenarios: 0.81; 
control scenarios: 0.93), upset ratings in Study 1 (transgression: 0.89; control scenarios: 0.88; wrongness ratings 
in Study 2 (transgression scenarios: 0.81; control scenarios: 0.82)), suggesting good internal consistency (please 
refer to ‘Supplementary Information’ for descriptions of all scenarios).
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analyses. A Siemens Avanto 1.5T MRI scanner at the Birkbeck-UCL Centre 
for Neuroimaging with a 32-channel head coil was used to acquire a 5.5 min 3D T1-weighted anatomical scan and 
multislice T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs) with BOLD contrast. The EPI sequence was based on38 (see 
‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for acquisition parameters, preprocessing pipeline and procedures for 
removing data corrupted by participant motion). Stimuli were presented using Cogent, running in Matlab 2011b 
(http://mathworks.com). Data were analysed in statistical parametric mapping (SPM).
For each version of the task, two first-level models were estimated for each participant: 1) to identify brain 
regions that responded differentially to the overall processing of moral transgressions (harm-to-self vs. harm 
to-other scenarios); 2) to identify regions that parametrically encoded the strength of feelings of guilt or wrong-
ness judgments elicited by the moral transgressions. In the first models (‘main effect’), regressors correspond-
ing to each condition were defined by the onset of the ‘outcome’ stage of the trial and lasted until the response 
(durations thus varied across trials from 6–10 s). This was to account for the fact that guilt- or wrongness-related 
processes may commence from the moment participants read the outcome right up until the point that ratings 
were given. Regressors were created by convolution of these boxcars with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function. Other events modelled in the analysis included: goal presentation (pooled across all scenarios); null 
trials; and errors (defined by non-response). Six realignment parameters were modelled as parameters of no 
interest in both analyses. The second models (‘parametric modulation’) were specified as the first model, but 
included guilt or wrongness ratings as parametric modulators of the regressors of interest (i.e. ‘harm-to-other’ 
and ‘harm-to-self ’). First-level contrast images were calculated by applying appropriate linear contrasts and were 
entered into second-level analyses.
Second-level one-sample t-tests were conducted for each contrast using the summary-statistics approach to 
random-effects analysis. Whole-brain analyses were conducted using a cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001 
(uncorrected), k > 10, and regions were reported as significant if they survived cluster-level whole-brain FWE 
correction (WBC) at p < 0.05. ROI analyses in the TPJ, SMG, aINS, amygdala and vmPFC were conducted 
using an initial threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) and responses were considered significant if they survived 
voxel-level small volume FWE correction (SVC) at p < 0.05. ROIs were anatomically defined using masks from 
the automated anatomical labelling (AAL) atlas39 (see ‘Supplementary Experimental Procedures’ for full details). 
To identify associations between brain responses and psychopathic traits, each facet of the SRP was entered as a 
regressor of interest in these second level models.
To identify regions showing significant activation differences between the two tasks (guilt and wrongness 
ratings), and differences in associations between activation and psychopathic traits, two additional two-sample 
t-test models were specified. In the first model, the main effect contrasts of the two tasks were compared 
([harm-to-other > harm-to-self in moral judgment task] > [harm-to-other > harm-to-self in guilt task]). 
Antisocial behaviour traits were entered as a covariate to assess whether associations with brain response dif-
fered significantly across the two tasks in the vmPFC and amygdala ROIs. In the second model, the two para-
metric modulators were compared ([parametric modulation of wrongness judgment] > [parametric modulation 
of guilt]). Interpersonal psychopathic traits were entered as a covariate to assess whether associations with the 
encoding of guilt differed significantly from the encoding of wrongness judgments in the aINS ROI. Age was 
added as a covariate in these analyses to control for the age difference between samples.
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